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Optimal taxation and monitoring in an economy 









This short paper shows the interdependence of taxation and monitoring policy in 
a  search  and  matching  model  of  equilibrium  unemployment  with  an 
underground  sector.  More  precisely,  from  a  social  welfare  standpoint,  two 
options are available to the policy maker: she/he may either substitute a tighter 
monitoring  with  a  higher  penalty  or  enforce  both  a  higher  taxation  and  an 
increased monitoring. 
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1.  The  interdependence  of  taxation  and  monitoring  in  a  matching 
framework 
The study of the effects of economic policies such as taxation, monitoring 
and  punishment  on  the  size  of  the  underground  economy  and  the  level  of 
involuntary  unemployment  is  the  focus  of  matching-type  models  with  an 
underground sector
1. However, a great many of these models do not discuss how 
the policy parameters can be optimally set by a policy maker who wants to 
maximize social output (shadow employment produces positive added value so 
some  tolerance  should  be  expected  from  an  efficiency  standpoint).  As  an 
exception, Boeri and Garibaldi (2002) show that the optimal taxation problem 
does not affect the policy-maker‟s choice with respect to the optimal monitoring 
of underground activities, whereas optimal taxation is affected by the optimal 
choice of monitoring (the separability result). Instead, this paper shows that the 
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optimal monitoring problem is also affected by the optimal choice of taxation. 
Precisely, there are two options available to the policy maker: s/he may either 
substitute a tighter monitoring with a higher penalty or enforce both a higher 
taxation and an increased monitoring. 
To make our point as simply as possible, we consider a basic matching 
framework ￠ la Pissarides (2000) with a continuum of homogeneous workers of 
measure  one.  The  creation  of  employment  occurs  in  a  labour  market  with 
matching frictions. As usual (see Pissarides, 2000; Petrongolo and Pissarides, 
2001),  an  aggregate  matching  function  is  used  to  summarize  these  frictions. 
Precisely, the number of job matches formed per unit of time is    v u m m ,  , 
where  u   is  the  number  of  unemployed  workers  and  v  is  the  number  of 
vacancies.  The  matching  function  is  strictly  increasing  but  concave  in  both 
arguments  and  displays  constant  returns  to  scale.  It  follows  that  the  labour 
market tightness is given by  u vi i /   , where the subscript    s f i ,  , with f = 
formal  and  s  =  shadow,  denotes  the  type  of  firm  (see  below).  Hence, 
     
1 , 1 /   ,
   i i i i m v u v q   m   and        1 , /   , i i i m u u v g     m ,  with 
  s f i ,  ,  are  the  probability  of  filling  a  vacancy  and  of  finding  a  job, 
respectively.
2 
We consider two types of firms, thus forming two sectors. Formal firms 
(with  f i  ) have to pay taxes  , whereas shadow firms (with  s i  ) enjoy tax 
evasion. 
To ensure that unemployment exists in steady state, it is assumed that 
job  destruction  occurs  at  the  exogenous  rate   .  Furthermore,  since  the 
underground  activities  are  detected  and  repressed  by  the  government  at  the 
exogenous  rate   ,  the  overall  job  destruction  rate  in  the  shadow  sector  is 
higher,  i.e.       .  Therefore,  in  steady  state  these  matching  and  job 
destruction rates allow us to describe the evolution of employment in the course 
of time (n  ): 
    f s f f f n n n g n         1                (1) 
      s s f s s n n n g n           1               (2) 
where  f n  and  s n  are the steady state employment rates, and  u n n s f    1  is 
the unemployment identity. 
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…  Underground sector  Regular sector 
a 
vacancy      s s s s s V J q c rV             f f f f f V J q c rV        
a filled 
job      s s s s s J V w y rJ             f f f f f J V w y rJ          
searching 
for a job      s s s s U W g b rU            f f f f U W g b rU       
being 
employed      s s s s W U w rW            f f f f W U w rW       
 
where r is the exogenous discounted rate; ci is the vacant job cost; yi is the 
match productivity, wi is the wage rate and b is the benefit of being unemployed. 
As usual (see Pissarides, 2000), the equilibrium value of labour market 
tightness is given by the free-entry condition or zero profit condition for firms 























                  (4) 
with  0      / f ,  0      / s ,  0
2 2      / f ,  0
2 2      / s  given the 
properties of matching function.
4 
By definition, an equilibrium with matching frictions requires positive 
and  finite  values  of  tightness  (    i  0 , i    ).  Whereas,  in  a  competitive 
equilibrium the firm has no vacant job cost (  i c 0), then the marginal condition 
for labour demand (i.e. the free-entry condition) reduces to the standard marginal 
productivity  condition for  employment  in the  steady  state  (Pissarides,  2000). 
Therefore, the competitive equilibrium outcome is  f f w y   , in the formal 
sector, and  s s w y   in the shadow sector. It follows that as long as  s f y y    
the underground sector is less attractive, but if  s f y y    then job matches 
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can  be  induced  to  remain  in  the  formal  sector  by  an  appropriate  choice  of 
taxation,  since  there  is  no  role  for  monitoring  rate  (in  fact,  the  competitive 
equilibrium outcome implies that  0   s f J J ). 
As usual in a matching framework, wages are the outcome of a bilateral 
matching problem described by the Nash bargaining solution, 
       
 
  i i
i
i
i i i i i i i V J U W V J U W w
i i  






1 max arg ,  with 
  s f i   ,                           
where    1   0,  i   is the bargaining  power of workers. Simple manipulations 
thus yield the formulae of wages: 
        f f f f f f f f rV y rU w             1         (5) 
        s s s s s s s s rV y rU w           1           (6) 
with    0  i i w  '   i    , since    0  i i V  ' , and    0  i i U  '   i    . 
Therefore,  for  given  policy  parameters     and   ,  equations  (1)  –  (6) 
together with the unemployment identity define a steady state (decentralised) 
equilibrium (with  0   s f n n   ). 
Now we derive the optimal level of taxation   and monitoring    in a 
context in which a policy-maker maximizes the social output, where the latter 
also includes the output and the vacancy cost in the shadow sector. Furthermore, 
we consider the case in which taxation is used by the benevolent social planner 
to  finance  the  benefit  of  being  unemployed,  i.e.    u b .  Following  the 
textbook of Pissarides (2000), the social welfare function for an infinitely-lived 
economy  is  equal  to  the net  output  per job,  minus  vacancies  costs,  plus the 
benefit of being unemployed. The policy-maker thus maximizes the following 
programme: 
5 
    

             
0
    dt u c u c n y n y e s s f f s s f f
rt      
subject to: 
 







    





n u g n
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distribution  and  distributional  considerations  are  excluded  from  the  social  welfare  function. 
Furthermore, the social planner is subject to the same matching constraints as firms and workers. 
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Let   and   be co-state variables (i.e. the shadow values) at the time t , 
so that the Hamiltonian (H) is: 
       
             


               


                  

s s f s f s f f
s f s s s f f f s s f f
rt
n n n g n n n g
n n c n n c n y n y e H
      




The solution to this dynamic maximization problem requires that: 
6 
 
0 1  


   












































          (II) 
                                  


r g g c c y
n
H
s f s s f f f
f
  (III) 
                                  


r g g c c y
n
H
s f s s f f s
s
  (IV) 
From the previous conditions, the result of interdependence between the optimal 
choice of taxation and the optimal choice of monitoring is straightforward, since 
conditions (I) – (IV) set up a set of four equations of four unknowns ( ,  ,  , 
 ). Furthermore, the sign of the relationship between taxation and monitoring 
crucially depends on   and  . 
In  steady  state  (with  0      ),  by  using  (III)  and  (IV)  algebraic 
manipulations give: 
        
                
      
   
        
          
 
r g r g r
c c y r y y g
f s
f f s s f s f s ,  (III b) 
        
                
    
   
        
        
 
r g r g r
c c y r y y g
f s
f f s s s s f f ,          (IV b) 
                                                           
6 Besides the transversality conditions, i.e. lim t → ∞ ∙ e
 –rt ∙ nf = 0 and lim t → ∞ ∙ e
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under the following two conditions: (i)  0    s f y y  ,
7 which is no better 
than an equilibrium condition, namely, in equilibrium an entrepreneur operates 
indifferently in one of the two sectors if  s f y y   ;  (ii)     r  is sufficiently 
small, which is a realistic condition since small calibration values are usual in 
the literature. More precisely,     r  ranges between 0.112 (Shimer, 2005) and 
0.18 (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007).
  















  remain  indeterminate. 
Therefore,  we  exploit  the  limited  available  information.  Precisely,  total 
differentiation of condition (II) gives: 
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7 In an equilibrium with matching frictions wages adjust in order to reach an equilibrium without 
corner solutions, since  0 /    i i w   (wage setting) but  0 /    i i w   (free-entry condition)  i    . 
In fact, if 
s f J J  , since  0   , then the resultant growth in formal vacancies increases formal 
wages ( 0 /    i i w  ) but in turn this effect reduces tightness in formal sector ( 0 /    i i w  ). 
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since  s c  is sufficiently low or even zero.
8 
Therefore, we may obtain both negative and positive relationship between 
taxation and monitoring policy. As a result, from the social welfare standpoint, 
two options are available to the policy maker: she/he may either substitute a 
tighter monitoring with a higher fine (the penalty is usually assessed on the level 
of taxes) or enforce both a higher taxation and an increased monitoring (this 
could be recommended in countries like Italy where public spending is very 
inelastic, public debt is very large and tax morale is very low). 
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